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The Annual General Meeting as an accountability mechanism 
ABSTRACT 
This review of Annual General Meetings (AGMs) as they evolved historically in English 
parishes and early joint-stock companies shows the manner in which they provided 
valuable opportunities to fulfil organisational accountability. AGMs enabled members 
to call elected governors to account and, in generating forums for organisational 
construction, supplied models which were foundational in early company law. As face- 
to-face meetings, AGMs were heterogeneous and presented non-financial information 
to augment publicly available financial information. 
Whilst low attendance at AGMs indicates apathy and modern technological advances 
may enable their replacement, recent calls to revise the legal requirement for an AGM 
have not gained traction. This paper therefore suggests a recommitment to the process 
of AGM accountability as practised in early public sector and profit-oriented 
organisations. This will enable today’s organisations to utilise the potential of the AGM 
as a formal and transparent mechanism to deliver accountability.
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Try skipping a meeting if you want to find out how important it is. Robert Townsend. 
It's my opinion, sir, that this meeting is drunk. Charles Dickens. The Pickwick Papers (1837). 
Charles Dickens in The Pickwick Papers parodied the self-laudatory nature of Annual 
General Meetings (AGMs). They can also be deadly boring or bullying, with many 
entities struggling to attract attendance from a quorum of interested members. It is 
difficult to find an individual who does not exhibit ritual expressions of loathing with 
regards these meetings, has myriad suggestions for how to run a ‘better one’ (or refuses 
to attend) and maintains they are necessary only because of a constitutional 
requirement. 
Yet the AGM can be a forum to lobby for change as well as to receive a formal 
presentation of the financial and non-financial performance of an organisation. Entities 
are required to hold AGMs under legislation i , and should entities fail to call an AGM, 
members can apply to the court to arrange a meeting replacement (Pitchforth, 1994). 
Nothing is described in legislation as to why an AGM should be held. However, 
Hodges, MacNiven & Mellett note that AGMS are an “established and common 
mechanism to enable members to receive accounts of the performance of an entity” 
(2004, p.377). Accordingly, it is assumed AGMs fulfil an accountability function, even 
though this is not formally expressed in the appropriate Acts. 
Whilst research has considered use of AGMs by shareholder activists (e.g. Marens, 
2002; Marinetto, 1998), Karpoff, Malatesta & Walkling (1996) are an example of 
researchers who have sought to test empirically the success of activists’ demands. From 
another aspect, Strätling (2003) investigates the United Kingdom Department of Trade 
and Industry proposals for AGM reform via its 1999 consultation document on 
Company General Meetings and Shareholder Communication. An overwhelming 
majority of respondents supported mandatory AGMs, as they enable democratic 
accountability between directors and shareholders. However, the only research located 
regarding the accountability aspect of AGMs, Hodges et al. (2004), found AGMs to be 
weak mechanisms of accountability in National Health Service Trusts based in the 
United Kingdom. The weaknesses related to the inability of the Trusts to engender a 
feeling of community combined with the use of the AGM as a ritualistic symbol. 
As an accepted part of society, the dearth of research on AGMs is surprising. The aim 
of this research was therefore to undertake a study of the history of AGMs to ascertain 
the unique aspects that ensure their continued existence in today’s society, despite the 
fact the AGM is seen as an imperfect vehicle for democratic accountability (Strätling, 
2003). It was found that AGMs afford necessary socialising to highlight the 
interdependence that encourages us to form co-operative ventures. In so doing, AGMs
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assist in organisational construction and therefore, are potentially formal mechanisms to 
highlight organisational accountability. 
The paper is organised with a very brief consideration of the meaning to members of 
organisational accountability, before tracing a selected history of the AGM. The use of 
the AGM in the early parishes in the United Kingdom as well as an early joint-stock 
company will be considered. The rise of shareholder activism in the United States from 
the 1930s considers how one group utilised the AGM as an accountability mechanism. 
Finally, the challenge of technology and postmodernism in relation to the centuries-old 
AGM and its prior ability to deliver accountability, will be briefly explored. 
1. Accountability 
Daily we are beset with calls for increased accountability, yet the history of membership 
organisations already includes the necessity for an AGM which, it is conjectured, 
performs accountability functions. This may mean that the mechanism is inadequate or 
that the boundaries of accountability itself are expanding as indeed Mulgan (1997) 
suggests. The Anglo-Saxon word accountability is commonly translated in other 
languages to mean ‘responsibility’ or a lower level of ‘answerability’ (Dubnick, 2002; 
Fry, 1995). Sinclair (1995) notes the chameleon (or protean) nature of accountability 
and certainly accountability becomes an issue when it is discovered there has been “a 
problem or breakdown in the meeting of expectations by one party in relation to 
another” (Fry, 1995, p.191). Stewart suggests that these “demands for greater… 
accountability are also expressions of deeper dissatisfaction” (1984, p.22). 
Therefore, Stewart (1984) narrows accountability relationships to those where 
accountability is contractually defined, thus producing a ‘bond of accountability’. Equity 
ownership of modern corporations, however, assumes an interactive interdependence, 
or accountability in action which is not purely contractual. Therefore Stewart 
acknowledges a ‘link of account’ (1984, p.25) to recognise organisational responsiveness 
when there is no contractual arrangement, but a moral responsibility. This link further 
strengthens and informs the bonds of contractual accountability. The essence of the 
accountability relationship: resource provision combined with delegation of 
responsibilities in relation to those resources by one group, requires reporting of that 
stewardship by those to whom the delegation has been made. 
Accountability, transcending both contractual and moral demands conceptually has a 
central role in governance (Dubnick, 2002). From an institutional viewpoint, 
accountability exists in four different areas. Firstly, accountability is evident in the rules 
and roles which control delegated authority. Alternatively, accountability is utilised in 
organisations to reduce uncertainty through informal and formal mechanisms. Trust, 
essential to social interaction, also enables individuals to interact with one another 
through accountability. Lastly, within complex environments, comprising “multiple, 
diverse, conflicting expectations, [accountability] is a means for managing an otherwise
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chaotic organisation” (Dubnick, 2002, p.5). Mulgan and Urr (as cited in Dubnick, 2002) 
suggest that these seemingly incommensurable uses of the concept accountability are in 
fact related and can be encapsulated in the term governance. In the social context 
where a moral community or collective identity creates a range of legitimate 
expectations among those community members, such governance attempts to make 
order (Dubnick, 2002). Therefore a particular community will negotiate order to create 
a collective identity, allocate responsibilities and require accountability for the execution 
of delegated tasks to enable continued successful governance. 
The focus of this research is on the relationship entities have with owners and 
members. Stewart (1984) and Mulgan (1997) emphasise that accountability is not one- 
sided but requires governors to provide transparent reports and members to call 
governors to account. The premise that governors operate best when they are held to 
account (Bavly, 1999) highlights the remaining three stages in the accountability process 
which are incumbent on those who are calling the governors to account: information- 
seeking or investigation; assessment or verification; and direction, control or imposition 
of penalty (Mulgan, 1997, 2003). The lines between each of these rights may be blurred, 
reflecting complex and subtle accountability relationships to different stakeholders who 
may separately undertake different parts of the process. However, shareholders in a 
limited liability company, or members in a voluntary organisation undertake both 
information-seeking and assessment duties to verify the stewardship of the resources 
they have entrusted to the entity (Bavly, 1999). As well, these rights may be further 
delegated, for example an independent audit of financial information will aid assessment 
and verification as well as increasing trust and effectiveness when explanations of the 
information are provided. When governors neglect their duty, shareholders are able to 
impose sanctions or obtain remedies through structured courts of appeal. 
Accountability is therefore an reflexive process, which not only highlights the 
interdependence of the accountability construct, but also improves accountability itself 
(Mulgan, 1997). Stakeholders and governors involved in dialogue are more likely to set 
and sustain acceptable levels of accountability. The act of giving an account in an 
accountability relationship is therefore an acknowledgement of intersubjectivity and 
confirms a moral relationship which transcends purely contractual accountability 
(Shearer, 2002). The moral obligations on any entity are shaped by the community’s 
shared understanding of those moral obligations and these are intrinsically linked to the 
accounts which an entity renders of itself. The act of reflection, fundamental to giving 
an account, combined with the discourse of the account, constructs the entity and in 
turn is socially constructing. “To be held to account by others has the effect of 
sharpening and clarifying our sense of self, convincing us that our actions make a 
difference, and providing focus within the stream of day to day experiencing” (Roberts, 
1996, p.44), underlining the process of accountability as a pre-eminent institutionalised 
social practice. 
Such social practices in entities are historically and culturally distinctive, involving 
formal accountability systems; annual statements to shareholders or procedures such as 
elections to name two; as well as more informal calling to account. On-going and
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contingent ‘observable-and-reportable’ practices (Willmott, 1996), accounting and the 
obligation to call to account (Mulgan, 1997), include the AGM as a process of 
accountability. 
Although accounting is almost synonymous with accountability, Stewart (1984) notes 
the limiting nature of the financial account alone. The use of many languages to many 
different audiences increases accountability effectiveness. For example, an AGM 
typically includes the presentation of financial accounts along with qualitative 
information on the organisation’s core competencies. Achievement of strategic goals 
may be measured and reported against by key performance indicators in both financial 
and non-financial terms (Pitchforth, 1994). To complete the accountability cycle those 
to whom an entity is accountable must be engaged in calling the entity to account 
(Mulgan, 1997). 
Further, the specific context of interaction between accountability partners will affect 
the accountability report. Roberts and Scapens (1985) seek to describe typical 
interactions which impact accountability reports and assessments. Such interactions will 
be affected by the relationship between the individuals or entities seeking accountability, 
the place or way in which the interaction occurs. Relationships may be close or distant, 
may be characterised by the typical hierarchical model of superior and subordinate, or 
the parties may converge within a lateral or socialising accountability base. When 
relationships are close (e.g. face-to-face), explanations can be questioned or challenged 
(Roberts & Scapens, 1985), whilst accountability provision to physically distant parties 
requires more homogeneous, standardised information. 
The place the information is provided also impacts accountability information. Roberts 
and Scapens suggest “the act of meeting to discuss results expresses and enacts a 
particular set of rights and obligations between the people involved… [and] will be 
open to further negotiation and refinement in the actual course of interaction” (1985, 
p.450). The AGM is an occasion for face-to-face accountability where accountability 
reports can be questioned and challenged and, in the act of meeting, provides a further 
insight for those present to assess that accountability. Further, “there is no reason to 
expect any one institution to fulfill all the functions of accountability” (Mulgan, 1997, 
p.35) and it is helpful to analyse institutional accountability mechanisms utilised by 
shareholders in order to assess their effectiveness as scrutinising functions and whether 
they can advance accountability. 
Tangible benefits and personal satisfaction draw us co-operatively to establish or 
become members of both business and non-business organisations (Chambers, 1955). 
This involves the investment of time, money and other resources and, intuitively, 
accountability for those investments. As shareholders and members ii are convinced of 
the value of their investment in resources, so they will work to strengthen those 
organisations. Chambers (1955) suggests committed members, aware of the 
consequences of the separation of ownership and management, should take a more 
active part in corporate affairs by taking advantage of their powers at an AGM in calling 
governors to account.
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2. The Annual General Meeting 
The AGM is potentially an accountability mechanism and worthy of further research. 
For this reason it was decided to trace AGM practice as it emerged in a variety of types 
of organisations. In each case studied, the AGM has provided an accountability 
mechanism, being evident in early charters of local government and articles of 
association for corporations, before being mandated by parliament. 
The AGM is an accepted part of society and has a long history. Bavly (1999) suggests 
the reason behind the AGM was a desire for democracy as it has been practised in 
some cantons of central and eastern Switzerland. There, once a year, the townsfolk 
gather at a landsgemeinde iii to vote for the top official, the Landammann and to make 
decisions on other agenda items. This practice or custom has been dated back to 1378 
AD. 
The Anglo-Saxon model of residents seeking democracy is most likely related to the 
Magna Carta of 1215, and the restraints it made on the monarchistic rights, in favour of 
local ruling lords iv . However, the working out of democracy at a local level is most 
evident in the parish structure, which developed after the Reformation (Tate, 1960). By 
1689 the parish was the dominant unit of local government in England, with the 
Church and State union continuing until at least the beginning of the nineteenth 
century. The parish governance structure included an AGM as did governance in the 
manorial boroughs and chartered townships (Webb & Webb, 1924a). Therefore a chief 
concern of those who attended and voted at AGMs seems to have been a desire for 
representative governance and some ability to influence the running of their local area 
in order to obtain accountability for the rates they had paid. 
2.1 The Local Annual General Meeting- England 
The working of the local parish varied greatly, but typically, four principal offices were 
held by the members of the parish: the Churchwarden, Constable, Surveyor of 
Highways, and Overseer of the Poor (as the ecclesiastical parish also provided public 
services). Webb and Webb (1924b) note that local methods for choosing officers varied 
from an open meeting of all parishioners, through to appointment by the Lord of the 
Manor, and included any combination of these. None of the officials were paid and, 
with service compulsory under an indiscriminate rotation system, some parishes 
accepted payment instead of forcing a parishioner to service (Smellie, 1957). It was not 
unknown for those who did serve to yield to the temptation to extract some financial 
reward from the job itself. 
The Churchwardens, effectively trustees of the parish, were required to manage the 
funds received and order such repairs to the church property as they thought fit. They 
presented themselves to the Archdeacon when he made his annual visitation, but 
interestingly, he had no right to refuse to swear them in or control their election. As
7 
temporal officers, the courts declared “the Churchwarden … has the property and 
custody of the parish goods; and as it is at the peril of the parishioners, so they may 
choose and trust whom they think fit” (Webb & Webb, 1924b, p.23). 
Generally there was no requirement for the Churchwardens to submit copies of annual 
accounts to any authority, or even to the inhabitants. However, when the 
Churchwardens found parish income insufficient and needed to levy an extra rate on 
inhabitants they were required to submit both accounts and the proposal regarding the 
rate, to a full meeting of the local inhabitants. Perhaps the rotating nature of the 
responsibilities and the close relationships in sparsely populated areas brought an 
understanding of the fairness of standard ratings and thus reduced the need for regular 
accountability when there was no change. 
Although some historians note otherwise v , Webb and Webb (1924b) and Tate (1960) 
find these parishioners’ meetings date from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, with 
the formal word vestry being assigned from the Parish of St. Christopher-le-Stocks 
from 1507 extending to other parishes later in the sixteenth century. These town (and 
church) meetings made by-laws on matters concerning the parish and, in mandating 
unpaid service, were more a local obligation than a window into democracy. 
The research of Webb and Webb (1924b) highlighted the typical parish AGM. In most 
small, rural parishes the clergyman would meet with the few landowners on Easter 
Monday or Tuesday. The principal business, the replacement of officers who sought to 
retire and confirming staff (the Parish Clerk and Sexton), was preceded by presentation 
of account books, which contained diverse income and expenditure vi .  The Surveyor of 
Highways and Overseer of the Poor would sign the appropriate accounts, before the 
meeting retired to the alehouse. Only landowners attended these meetings, as labourers 
were not rated. Therefore only about one-third of local families had a say in the running 
of the parish. Women were not excluded from voting if they had land, but Capp (2003) 
suggests they seldom succeeded in exercising those rights vii . In some towns, especially in 
the nineteenth century, the number of votes cast by individuals was based on the 
valuation of their property and if rates had not been paid, their votes were disallowed. 
Voting was typically by marks against names, or later, by a show of hands, but rarely by 
secret ballot. 
This system was very much the parish oligarchy, but the growth of townships and larger 
metropolitan areas in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, combined with 
the Glorious Revolution’ affecting social aspirations viii , extended participation in parish 
government to the inhabitants at large. As such, the vestry could retreat to a Close or 
Select vestry system, or employ an Open vestry with governance through an effective 
AGM.
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2.1.1 The Open Vestry 
As parish administration tended to be increasingly characterised as an Open vestry, 
meetings of the key officers (also termed ‘vestry’) continued to meet monthly to “relieve 
the poor, repair the church and mend the roads” (Webb & Webb, 1924b, p.54). 
Ratepayers’ public meetings (the ‘public vestry’) were still called in the church especially 
when capital works were required, conscription or an increase in rates was called for. 
This model was exhorted in a pamphlet in 1767 and other booklets later (Webb & 
Webb, 1924b). Further, an annual audit was required by a committee and Webb and 
Webb (1924b) recount a team of eleven in Deptford Parish in 1731 and twelve in 
Norwich. 
In some parishes, for example Leeds with more than 75,000 inhabitants, vestry 
meetings were quarrelsome and clamourous and became a “battlefield of political and 
religious animosities” (Webb & Webb, 1924b, p.94). In 1828 three to five thousand 
parishioners in Leeds attended a prolonged vestry meeting which refused to pass the 
accounts. The outcome of this was that Leeds began to produce elaborate financial 
statements annually, printing them in the local newspapers and consulting the public 
assembly on every important occasion (Webb & Webb, 1924b). 
As parishes grew, public meetings became unwieldy. Manchester, with a population of 
one hundred thousand in 1832, provide another example of rowdy, tumultuous and 
unwieldy meetings. Experiences such as this led to the Reform Act of 1832, which 
further changed local government in England, and attempted to harmonise practice and 
parochial boundaries to cope with the increasing population. 
Social reform, encouraged by the Glorious Revolution viii , raised leaders from lower 
social classes. These people, who had not traditionally been associated with governing, 
experienced an awareness of political opportunity and the power of democratic 
functions. An example of the effect of the AGM was the petition tabled in parliament 
in 1817 calling for annual national elections and suffrage for all men 18 years and over, 
who paid taxes (Smart, 1910). 
The events as described provide evidence of a model of governance that began in the 
local church, related to land ownership initially, but grew to provide rights and impose 
obligations on a widening group of the population. As an extra-legal constitution, the 
working of the Vestries relied on the local population as well as other authorities. 
However, the dissolution of the church and state union saw its effectiveness as a local 
authority structure decline. The Sturges Bourne Acts of 1819 sought to change this and 
also instigated a system of Select Vestries based on Closed Vestries. The Closed vestry, 
a fragment of a parish, carried on the business of local governance without reference to 
a wider set of inhabitants. Closed vestries had become embedded in some small, 
wealthy parishes where powerful vestry members served for life. Protests and later 
reform broke these enclaves as democratic rights were claimed. Lord Hobhouse, who 
was instrumental in this 1830 reform, was able to obtain suffrage for all rate payers and 
legally institute annual elections (Webb & Webb, 1924b).
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From these centuries of evolution of local governance, there are four main themes from 
these historical structures that relate to the current study of AGMs. These are the 
regularity of public meetings and the importance of socialising as well as business in the 
meetings themselves. The AGM assisted in organisational construction and was not 
without its conflict and challenges. 
Firstly, there were regular meetings, at least annually. Although it has been suggested 
that the accountings were from one Easter to the next, AGMs seemed to have varied in 
date from Easter, through June and also as late as St Michaelmas ix Day in September. 
AGMs evaluated parish accounts and debated issues of policy as well as electing officers 
to carry on parish business during the year. Where there was a lack of accountability, 
overspending or defalcation by these officers, the officers were dismissed and the vestry 
reformed. Service as an officer was for the public interest first and foremost. 
The combination of business and socialising is also shown historically. The public- 
house was a popular parish government meeting spot with a number of parishes having 
private vestry meetings at different taverns in rotation (Tate, 1960) x . The Minute books, 
which were sometimes signed by those assembled to signify authentic decisions, 
described the eating and drinking, as well as the decisions of vestry. 
Thirdly, the meeting itself constructed the entity. Such was the lack of definition of the 
geographical bounds of the parish, that ‘annual perambulations’ were advised by 
Archbishop Stillingfleet in 1698 (Webb & Webb, 1924b). When law courts established 
formal boundaries, they commonly retained existing limits and the perambulations 
(‘beating the bounds’) became less regular. 
Further, AGMs experienced the usual challenges of democratic governance. The 
temptation not to be involved unless one was compelled to, or had a particular interest 
in an issue, is borne out by examples in Webb and Webb (1924b) where eligible voters 
did not attend AGMs until the imposition of high rates or other pecuniary liabilities 
forced on them by the governing vestry, provided an imperative. Apathy is widely 
recounted in historical vestry minutes. The difficulty in resolving particular issues is 
highlighted in a commentary from one Vicar who lamented time lost in “waiting for 
more attendants, in trifling conversation, or in squabbling about things foreign to the 
subject…” (Webb & Webb, 1924b, p.92). Yet there was also the enthusiasm of “sharp 
electoral contests lasting till midnight” (Webb & Webb, 1924a, p.142n) showing the 
public could be enthusiastic about accountable governance. 
2.2 The Joint-Stock Company – England 
Almost contemporaneous with the sixteenth century model of local government was 
the emergence of the joint-stock corporation in England. By the late nineteenth century 
significant numbers of trading and manufacturing firms availed themselves of fresh 
opportunities to incorporate under Companies Acts (from 1844 onwards) as previously
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incorporation had required a time consuming and expensive special Act of Parliament, 
(Armstrong & Jones, 1987). Governance of these early joint-stock companies varied, 
however the following sub-section considers the requirements for an AGM in the East 
India Company. This company gained a monopoly in British-Indian trade and was 
ultimately involved in British rule in India. As one of the largest and longest surviving 
of these early joint-stock companies it maintained a diverse shareholding and therefore 
its AGMs are of interest. Subsequent to this discussion, the way in which developments 
such as the Joint Stock Acts in England in the nineteenth century incorporated best 
practice for shareholders, will also be reviewed. 
2.2.1 The East India Company 
The East India Company obtained its first charter from Parliament in 1599 and was 
subscribed by two hundred and eighteen investors xi . Its capital was obtained from a 
wide sphere of investors who were prepared to commit funds for a reasonable period 
(Chaudhuri, 1965). Initially, capital was invested on a voyage-by-voyage basis and 
stockholders, or proprietors as they were called, expected to see the return of their 
capital with a dividend at the end of each voyage, typically three to four years after the 
initial investment. However by 1609, the company sought a new charter and ended the 
policy of financing each voyage separately, so that stockholders’ funds were thereafter 
used for the general operations of the company, with profits being distributed in 
proportion to capital invested. Contemporaneous with this new charter, the number of 
shareholders was increased to 276 (Gardner, 1971). 
For the purposes of this research, the governance mechanism with regards a General 
Meeting only will be described. Twenty-four directors were selected to form the Court 
of Committees, which was effectively the Board of Directors or governors xii .  Any 
proprietor (stockholder) could attend the quarterly Court meetings which were held in 
the General Court Room of East India House (the London headquarters) and at which 
the financial situation was presented (Chaudhuri, 1965). However, only those 
proprietors who had invested £1,000 or more could vote and those with £10,000 or 
more invested had four votes each. By the late eighteenth century, around fifty 
proprietors met this threshold and became extremely powerful (Gardner, 1971). Both 
Gardner (1971) and Chaudhuri (1965) recount the voluble meetings at which these 
proprietors criticised governance procedures and cost overruns. 
The Court of Committees was answerable to all proprietors, but the directors were 
Crown office-holders as well as gentry, and this gave rise to factional and constitutional 
disputes. In 1628, members of the General Court xiii criticised the Committees for 
managing business without the consent of all proprietors and pressed for auditors to be 
appointed from within the General Court. They also took exception to the salaries paid 
to the Governor and other officers. The Court of Committees responded by moving 
that a ballot box be used for voting and that the King (Charles I) be given a one-fifth 
share in the Company in return for his more active support. Both of these motions 
were defeated; with the resolution that only those who had £2,000 or more invested
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could be voted onto the Court of Committees (Chaudhuri, 1965). Such quarrels 
between the proprietors and the governors were typical in this Company of the period 
between 1620 and 1640 when trading difficulties were experienced. 
One quarter of the Court of Committees retired each year and the charter allowed for 
them to be replaced from the General Court of proprietors. The reality was that the 
governors:
“held so many votes between them that they voted for each other in 
terms, going in and out of office by strict rotation; in this way directors 
were invariably voted back in after a year out of office, or could pass 
the privilege on to sons and relatives” (Gardner, 1971, p.129). 
It was a closed circle that effectively stifled the democratic governance advocated by the 
charter of 1609 under which the East India Company was formed as well as the 
succeeding replacement charters. 
Financial dependency changed the nature of the East India Company’s governance. By 
1772, on the verge of bankruptcy, the Company approached the Government for a 
loan. In return for the £1,500,000 advanced, a Regulating Act was passed to bring 
management of the Company under the indirect control of the Crown and Parliament 
through a Board of Control (Gardner, 1971). The Court of Committees lost its power 
and although minority proprietors continued to express public disquiet about the 
Company, they lacked effective means to force change. 
General stockholder meetings had been a regular feature within the governance of this 
large and long-standing joint-stock company. Quarterly meetings of proprietors 
provided the aura of accountability as did regular governor rotation; but the real task of 
governance fell to those who had invested the most and were socially powerful. 
Proprietor disquiet with select joint-stock companies such as the East India Company, 
combined with industry expansion subsequent to the Industrial Revolution, eventually 
led to more flexible forms of incorporation. 
2.2.2 Joint Stock Acts 
Moss (1994) notes the similarity of the requirements for record-keeping and 
representative governance from the Parishes Acts of the early nineteenth century to the 
changes later wrought on joint-stock companies. Prior to the Joint Stock Companies 
(Registration) Act of 1844, corporations had been formed by Acts of Parliament, 
Crown charter, or (after 1825) letters of patent from the Board of Trade. Each 
corporation had their own charter which included governance rules. The Companies 
Clauses Consolidation Act of 1845 reflected a significant change in policy as these 
corporations were required to, amongst other things, keep full and true accounts and 
present a balance sheet to the shareholders meeting half-yearly, thus signalling the need 
for such meetings (Armstrong & Jones, 1987).
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The 1844 Joint Stock Companies (Registration) Act, which had a wider influence as it 
covered new joint-stock companies, also legislated for a shareholders meeting, to be 
held annually. As well, a ‘full and fair’ balance sheet needed to be sent to the registered 
address of every shareholder at least ten days before the annual meeting. This same 
balance sheet was to be presented at the shareholder meeting; and the Minutes of that 
meeting kept. Further refinements of 1856 and 1862 required a Statement of Income 
and Expenditure to be presented along with the balance sheet. In the Companies 
(Consolidation) Act 1908, a Directors’ report was added to meeting requirements. After 
the Companies Act 1929 was passed, an auditor’s report needed to accompany this 
growing bundle of information which was now required to be sent out to shareholders 
one week in advance of the meeting (Armstrong & Jones, 1987). 
Although parliamentary Acts defined minimum requirements, an individual company’s 
Articles of Association defined the types of shareholder meetings (ordinary, annual and 
extra-ordinary), the frequency of such meetings, and rules as to who can call an extra- 
ordinary shareholders meeting. Articles of Association also laid down procedures for 
meetings regarding the election of a Chairman, quorum and methods of voting 
(including proxies), procedures for resolutions and the requirement for annual accounts 
to be presented at an AGM (Armstrong & Jones, 1987). 
These legal requirements combined with Articles of Association clauses show that 
democratic governance including the custom of the public meeting, long a part of local 
government, was solidly embedded in early Company practice. Further, at the AGM, 
“the shareholders expected their chairman to give an in-depth appraisal of the 
company, be willing to answer any questions, move the adoption of the accounts and 
propose the re-election of any retiring directors” (Armstrong & Jones, 1987, p.75). Such 
shareholders’ demands were predicated on concepts of equity ownership and a need to 
familiarise themselves with, and approve of, the directors’ actions. Therefore it was 
important to have a strong, loquacious Chairman. 
Although Chairman’s reports of large companies would be typically printed in the local 
newspapers (Maltby, 2004), none of these printed sources could be quite as informative 
as attending the AGM. Prior to the 1948 Companies Act in the United Kingdom, 
mandatory printed disclosures were limited. The AGM was a place where shareholders 
could obtain non-standardised or heterogeneous, face-to-face company information by 
asking questions about challenging issues that directors may want to avoid and not have 
been prepared to put in written information. However, Maltby (2004) provides 
examples where the Chairman refused questions by citing market sensitivity of 
information and by emphasising trust relationships, effectively controlled information 
provision. Hodges et al. (2004) quote modern examples of this exercise of power when 
the scope of decision-making and debate is confined to “safe” issues. 
The paper has so far reviewed the emergence and composition of AGMs in two 
different organisational types, local government and limited liability companies. In both 
organisations there is a group with the right to information about the organisation, 
typically predicated on the provision of resources by this group who have not received
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an immediate return in kind. As well, resource provision ties the group to the 
organisation and is evidenced by their holding ratepayer, membership, or shareholder 
status. The rights to manage these resources are ceded to a small subset of their group: 
the governors whom they must trust. Accordingly there is an historical and socially 
expected accountability requirement from those governors back to their group on past 
achievements and prospects for the future; and this has been fulfilled, in some great 
measure, by the AGM. 
2.3 The AGM in today’s society 
As an organisation grows, a disparate group of members or shareholders typically lacks 
organisation, becomes more divorced from their elected representatives, and may be 
unable to demand the information xiv about governance they require, or be unaware that 
they lack information. Further, Chen (1975) suggests that the nature of the stewardship 
relationship previously enjoyed by owners expands to include an entity’s responsibility 
to account to wider society. These challenges to the democratic governance function 
threaten the relevance of a members’ AGM in today’s society. However, the AGM 
remains as the only place where individual members can have access to governors and 
management (MacDonald, 2004). The building of good relationships between 
governors and members is a feature of the twenty-first century corporate as much as it 
was hundreds of years ago in local government and joint-stock corporations. Hence, 
AGM communication between members and governors should continue to reproduce 
democracy. Although the advent of glossy corporate reports combined with the 
marketplace may satisfy a member’s economic requirements, the AGM serves a 
socialising function, socially constructing the organisation, reminding individuals and 
organisations of their interdependence. Therefore new ways of communication with 
owners have been sought in order that groups may continue to negotiate accountability 
of their organisations. 
The desire to improve access to twenty-first century AGMs has seen changes in 
many countries’ regulations to allow technology enhancements and effective AGM 
practice. On-line voting is an option utilised in the USA, France, and being investigated 
by corporations in the United Kingdom (Strätling, 2003). Anecdotal evidence suggests 
that in New Zealand, telephone conferencing has been used for small membership 
societies’ AGMs. In Finland, a bill mooted in 2000 proposed amendments to enable 
foreign shareholders to participate in AGMs, by relaxing the cut-off date for registration 
of shares and allowing participation in AGMs through video or network connections 
(Anonymous, 2000). Dispersed AGMs which would reduce costs for shareholders 
seeking to attend are therefore becoming more popular. New Zealand’s largest 
company (by revenue), Fonterra televises its AGM over nine venues (Ferrier, 2004). 
However, not all technology is popular. Strätling (2003) reported negative 
feedback to the issue of text-only AGMs in a United Kingdom survey. “Respondents 
assume that the body language of directors as well as of shareholders gives an indication
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of the gravity of the issue raised as well as the honesty and confidence of a statement” 
(Strätling, 2003, p.79), showing strong preference for combined video and voice links. 
Bergquist (1993) enlightens the debate by noting the postmodern world’s preference for 
aural, face-to-face communication, as technology makes the written word passé. 
Accordingly, it is the conversations between members and governors within 
postmodern organisations that will continue to construct the organisation, and it is 
these that may increase enthusiasm for the AGM. Corporations must make the AGM 
accessible, have open election processes, and make voting rights obvious to those 
committing resources to the organisation. These actions enable the continuation of 
democratic processes that will enhance accountability. 
3. Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper has traced a selected history of the AGM from its early use in local 
government and joint stock companies in England in the fifteenth century and beyond 
(e.g. Chaudhuri, 1965; e.g. Webb & Webb, 1924b), through to large corporate AGMs in 
the present day. As a rite of democracy, AGMs are required of constituted entities by 
controlling Acts, and governing charters. AGMs comprise an annual calling to account 
of governors xv ; a forum for members to elect new governors; and opportunities to 
verify the information provided; as well as to control governors. The AGM’s essence is 
in highlighting accountability for delegated resources by combining governor feedback 
on past performance to members; along with information relevant for those seeking to 
make ongoing commitments to the organisation. These actions re-affirm the 
interdependence that remains the basis of co-operative corporations. 
As well as fulfilling a function of democratic governance, AGMs have helped to 
construct the entity by beating the bounds (Webb & Webb, 1924b) and recognising 
social relationships (e.g. Hagaman, 1995) despite apathy on the one hand and conflict 
on the other (e.g. Chaudhuri, 1965). Shareholder interest in reports of meetings (Maltby, 
2004) and early parish experiences (e.g. Leeds in 1828) show that governors responded 
to community demands by delivering higher levels of accountability (Webb & Webb, 
1924b). Modern day activists have emerged at intervals to ensure that corporate 
governors listen to their minority views (Marens, 2002) and shareholder groups 
continue to monitor this democratic function. Therefore it is unsurprising that 
governors and shareholders continue to support mandatory AGMs (Strätling, 2003). 
Despite the variant AGM forms now possible due to technology, the postmodern 
world appears to continue to favour face-to-face conversations, or at least combined 
video-voice links between members and governors (Strätling, 2003). Further research 
into shareholder’s attitudes affecting AGM attendance and the effectiveness of AGMS, 
is required. 
Dubnick (2002) suggests communities will negotiate unique collective accountabilities 
and a sense of community, yet Hodges et al. (2004) found the National Health Service
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Trusts failed to do this at their AGMs. The challenge for corporations today is therefore 
to harness the positive aspects of AGMs to address ‘expressions of dissatisfaction’ 
which have caused the extension of the boundaries of accountability (Stewart, 1984, 
p.22). Governors need to furnish members with authentic AGMs that facilitate 
community by highlighting interdependence, constructing the organisation and 
delivering accountability. 
i Examples from New Zealand are: the Companies Act (1993); the Education Act (1989); and the Incorporated 
Societies Act (1908). 
ii These will be collectively described as members from now on. 
iii Literally translated this means main street. However it also means community meeting held in an enclosed square 
(Downloaded March 23, 2005 from http://www.ai.ch/en/politik/sitzung/). 
iv Magna Carta information downloaded March, 23, 2005 from http://www.bl.uk/collections/treasures/magna.html. 
v Webb and Webb (1924b) note Toulmin Smith asserts the civil origin of the parish and assumed a democratic 
constitution in the Old English village community. 
vi These included the costs of ‘dressing the fields for the crows’, mixed with the costs of sacramental wine, gifts of 
clothing for the poor, fitting irons for the whipping post and an annual item of ‘keeping the books, as usual, one 
shilling’ (Webb & Webb, 1924b, p.44). 
vii Capp (2003) recounts the votes cast for a new minister in 1644 at St Peter’s, Cornhill included those of eight 
women amongst the men. Also, some women held minor parish offices, but if nominated for a major office, like a 
Churchwarden, they would typically ask a proxy, seldom serving in person. 
viii This period relates to the abdication of James II due to the successful invasion of England  James’ daughter Mary 
and her husband William of Orange. The Bill of Rights passed subsequently in 1689 established the constitutional 
monarchy that saw Parliament grow to be the real governing authority over the next century. It also set the basis 
for increased democracy (Duiker & Spielvogel, 2005). 
ix An interesting choice of day because custom had it that eating a goose on Michaelmas, (Sept 29) provided 
protection against financial need for the next year. This date seems to be related to the requirement noted in Tate 
(1960) to elect a Surveyor of highways on September 22. 
x One rector noted that such vestry meetings were illegal, a fact encapsulated in legislation passed in Britain in 1933 
(Tate, 1960) 
xi Charters expired on a regular basis having a lifetime of around 10-15 years. 
xii The Court of Committees formed twelve sub-committees to deal with aspects of each voyage. 
xiii The General Court could be attended by all proprietors 
xiv See Marens (2002) for a discussion on shareholder organisation. 
xv Through both financial and non-financial reports (Armstrong & Jones, 1987).
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